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The Case for a Human Rights Act Based Approach to 
Unfair Dismissals Engaging Convention Rights: 
Challenging Judicial Attitudes and Assessing Potential 
Alex Shellum* 
ABSTRACT 
The protection which the law of unfair dismissal offers to those dismissed in circumstances 
which engage their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights is anaemic. In 
such circumstances, judges continue to take a deferential approach to managerial discretion. 
This paper seeks to make the argument that judges should apply the same rigorous standards 
in unfair dismissal cases as they do in public law under the Human Rights Act. In doing so, 
the author challenges prevailing judicial attitudes in labour law, including a critical treatment 
of the judgment in Turner v East Midlands Trains, and assesses the impact that a genuine 
Human Rights Act based approach would have on this area.  
INTRODUCTION 
The law of unfair dismissal, legislated for in Part X, Employment Rights Act 
1996 (ERA), favours the employer. It does so by restricting access to claims 
through a narrow personal scope;1 through judges taking a laissez-faire approach 
to the reasons for, and reasonableness of, employers’ decisions to dismiss;2 and 
* The author is a part-time BPTC student and Bedingfield Scholar of Gray’s Inn. Prior to
commencing the BPTC, the author read for his BA in law at the University of Cambridge 
and then for an LLM, specialising in Human Rights Law, at the LSE, in which he was 
awarded a Distinction (2015 – 2016). 
1 Employment Rights Act 1996, s 94(1), s 108 (ERA 1996). 
2 Ibid s 98; Iceland Frozen Foods Ltd v Jones [1983] 1CR 17 (EAT); Turner v East Midlands 
Trains [2012] EWCA Civ 1470, [2013] ICR 525. 
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through an anaemic remedial regime.3 These three principal imbalances in the 
law of unfair dismissal are shown at their most egregious when the dismissal in 
question is one that engages a dismissed employee’s Convention rights.4 This is 
the species of dismissal with which this essay is concerned – its purpose is to 
present the case for a Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) based approach to 
dismissals engaging employees’ Convention rights. 
The case has been made by Collins that compulsory protection of job 
security, and the correlative ability to claim unfair dismissal – underpinned by 
the two values of dignity and autonomy – constitutes a right in and of itself.5 
The theory of dismissal law is beyond the scope of this essay, but the analysis 
within is written taking Collins’ characterisation of the value of just dismissal law 
as sound. The principles of dignity and autonomy, which underlie many of the 
Convention rights upon which this paper’s case for a more robust dismissal 
regime will be built,6 are familiar terms to labour and human rights law 
scholarship alike.7 
The reasons for advocating the present approach based on the HRA are 
threefold: firstly, it is more grounded in the plausible than a call for legislative 
intervention to a government which has orchestrated a drastic decline in the 
number of cases brought before employment tribunals;8 secondly, as will be 
demonstrated below, there is no current statutory impediment to interpreting 
the law on unfair dismissal in light of the HRA where appropriate; and, thirdly, 
legislative intervention without challenging judicial attitudes, which have proven 
thus far to be resilient to legislative coaxing, may fail to effect any real change. 
As ACL Davies puts it, ‘it seems to be quite difficult for Parliament to alter the 
judges’ perception of their proper place in employment law’.9 
This third reason alludes to the greatest obstacle to a HRA based approach 
to dismissals, and Part I of this essay will attempt to overcome it. This is the 
non-interventionist, deferential, and contractual view that judges have 
	
	
3 ERA 1996, ss 111-32. 
4 Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998).  
5 Hugh Collins, Justice in Dismissal: The Law of Termination of Employment (Oxford 
monographs on labour law) (OUP 1992) 15-21. 
6 Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 [65]. 
7 Mark Freedland and Nicola Kountouris, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations 
(OUP 2011) pt 2 ch 3; Jeremy Waldron, 'How Law Protects Dignity' (2012) 71(01) The 
Cambridge Law Journal 200. 
8 Ministry of Justice, ‘Tribunal and Gender Recognition Statistics Quarterly: April to June 
2015’<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fil
e/459787/tribunals-and-gender-recognition-bulletin.pdf> accessed 1 May 2016. 
9 ACL Davies, 'Judicial Self-Restraint in Labour Law' (2009) 38(3) Industrial Law Journal 
278, 304. 
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historically adopted with regards to labour law.10 This judicial attitude may be 
challenged on two fronts: firstly, by distinguishing labour law from public law; 
and, secondly, by analogising labour law with public law (the challenge from 
analogy). The former is convincingly articulated by Davies – the constitutional 
constraints upon the judiciary in public law cases, which triggers judicial self-
restraint and deference, are largely inapplicable to labour law cases.11 In the 
interests of space, this essay takes Davies’ view to be correct and will refrain 
from further exposition. The challenge from analogy retrofits Gearty’s analysis 
of judicial restraint and deference where Convention rights are engaged, 
paradigmatically in the public context, and applies it to Convention rights 
sensitive dismissals.12 It will be claimed that cases involving Gearty’s three 
principles of respect for human dignity, legality, and civil liberties – each of 
which he shows induce courts to robust engagement as opposed to restraint or 
deference – should give rise to similar levels of scrutiny and intervention in 
dismissals where those same principles are engaged.  
In seeking to make the case for a HRA based approach to dismissals 
engaging Convention rights, this essay proceeds in three parts: Part I assesses 
the applicability of the HRA to unfair dismissal law and launches the challenge 
from analogy to propose a revised judicial methodology. Part II applies the 
HRA in conjunction with this revised methodology to problem areas in the 
current law of unfair dismissal – personal scope; the reasons for, and 
reasonableness of, decisions to dismiss; and, remedies. Part III offers concluding 
thoughts on the value to be gained from a HRA based approach to dismissals 
engaging Convention rights and suggests some areas for further fruitful 
research. 
 
I. DISMISSALS ENGAGING THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 
	
The Horizontal Hurdle 
 
‘The horizontal hurdle’ refers to the HRA’s lack of explicit provision for 
horizontal effect between employer and employee. On its face, the HRA is 
merely vertically effective between state and individual. The hurdle, however, is 
low – ‘There can be no doubt that the HRA is fully capable of application to 
	
	
10 Davies, Judicial Self-Restraint (n 9) 278, 287. 
11 Ibid 289-290. 
12 Conor Gearty, Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (OUP 2005). 
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employment law’.13 The combination of the s 3 HRA interpretative obligation 
on courts, to read and give effect to legislation compatibly with Convention 
rights ‘so far as it is possible to do so’, and the s 6 HRA duty on courts and 
tribunals to act in a manner compatible with Convention rights, generates 
horizontal effect. Consequently, the HRA applies to unfair dismissal when 
Convention rights are engaged. Indeed, the fact that unfair dismissal is defined 
by flexible concepts of ‘reasonableness’ render it well-suited to interpretation 
under the HRA.14  
This analysis is uncontroversial and enjoys explicit judicial approval in X v 
Y.15 In X, the applicant, who was employed by a charity working with young 
offenders, was dismissed following discovery by a police officer of his engaging 
in consensual sex with another adult male in a public lavatory – a criminal 
offence. He complained that the dismissal involved a breach of his rights under 
Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
scheduled to the HRA.16 On the facts, the Court of Appeal found no breach of 
the applicant’s rights due to the public nature of the lavatory – an approach 
which has received criticism.17 What is important for present purposes, 
however, is that Mummery LJ accepted that the s 6(1) HRA duty requires courts 
and tribunals, as public authorities, to interpret existing employment legislation 
compatibly with the Convention rights.18 
The effect of X, therefore, is to vault ‘the horizontal hurdle’ and 
demonstrate that there is no statutory impediment to interpreting the law on 
unfair dismissal in light of the HRA in appropriate cases – those with a ‘human 
rights hook’. 
 
Human Rights Hooks 
	
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate: A. The types of dismissal which engage Convention rights.  
	
	
13 Hazel Oliver, 'Employment Law' in David Hoffmann (ed), The Impact of the UK Human 
Rights Act on Private Law (CUP 2011), 345. 
14 Ibid 350. 
15 [2004] EWCA Civ 662, [2004] ICR 1634. 
16 European Convention on Human Rights 1950, Arts. 8 and 14 (ECHR). 
17 See Virginia Mantouvalou, 'Human Rights and Unfair Dismissal: Private Acts in Public 
Spaces' (2008) 71(6) Modern Law Review 912. 
18 X (n 15) [49], [58], [64]. 
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framework in Principles of Human Rights Adjudication, to dismissals 
engaging Convention rights.19  
 
Types of Dismissal Engaging Convention Rights 
 
In order for a dismissal to attract a HRA analysis the dismissal must engage the 
employee’s Convention rights as provided for in the Act under Schedule 1. This 
is problematic as the HRA does not incorporate into domestic law the 
European Social Charter – the document which contains the right to protection 
in cases of termination of employment.20 Moreover, the position that jobs 
constitute property rights does not enjoy significant support within the 
literature.21 To contest otherwise would be to either unjustifiably tip the balance 
of the law in favour of the employee, or to corrupt the strength that 
characterises property rights by allowing for non-consensual deprivation in cases 
of rational dismissal. Consequently, a job does not come within the scope of the 
‘right to property’ in the Convention.22 This precludes a universal HRA based 
review in cases of unfair dismissal. There are, however, a number of instances in 
which Convention rights will be engaged by a dismissal. 
The most relevant ‘human rights hook’ is the right to privacy under Article 
8 ECHR, which extends to the workplace.23 The right has, however, thus far 
alluded definition as to scope.24 However, Strasbourg has clearly adopted an 
expansive approach to privacy. The right to privacy includes the maintenance of 
relationships with others and the ability to develop new relationships.25 Given 
the amount of time spent at work during one’s lifetime, it is clear that such a 
conception of privacy lends itself to engagement in dismissal. Moreover, Article 
8 has been applied in cases where an employer has dismissed an employee 
owing to matters in the employee’s private life outside of work, particularly in 
the context of sexual orientation.26 The reputational element of privacy, 
	
	
19 Gearty, Principles (n 12). 
20 Council of Europe, European Social Charter (Revised) 1996, Art. 24. 
21 Collins, Justice in Dismissal (n 5) 9-12. 
22 ECHR, art 1 First Protocol. 
23 Halford v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 523. 
24 Niemitz v Germany (1992) EHRR 97 [29]. 
25 ibid; Connors v United Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 9 [82]; Sidabras v Lithuania [2006] 42 
EHRR 6 [48].  
26 Smith and Grady v United Kingdom (1999) 29 EHRR 493. 
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established in Pfeifer, also has application to the employment context.27 This may 
be seen by the judgment in R (Wright) where the stigma of the dismissal in the 
circumstances was a contributory factor to the breach of the right to privacy in 
that case.28  
 
Although tangential to the present enquiry, it is noteworthy that domestic 
courts have, however, been reluctant to find the right to privacy engaged in 
certain circumstances.29 For present purposes, it suffices to say that the 
Strasbourg court has subsequently offered clarification on the position in Pay v 
UK – acts need not necessary take place in a private environment in order to be 
protected by the right to privacy.30   
 
Article 10 ECHR, the right to freedom of expression, presents a further 
‘human rights hook’. Dismissals for political speech and affiliation, in particular, 
have consistently been deemed to engage the right to freedom of expression at 
the Strasbourg level.31 Dismissals relating to dress code are another scenario in 
which the right to freedom of expression may be engaged.32 Although collective 
labour law is beyond the scope of this paper, it is also relevant that dismissals 
relating to trade union membership will engage Article 11 ECHR, the right to 
freedom of association, and are therefore susceptible to a HRA based 
approach.33 Articles 10 and 11 ECHR, therefore, constitute further ‘human 
rights hooks’ upon which a HRA based approach to unfair dismissal may attach. 
The example rights and scenarios given are by no means exhaustive.  
 
The Challenge From Analogy  
 
The scenarios in the previous sub-section may also act as examples upon which 
the challenge from analogy with public law to judicial attitudes in dismissal 
cases, introduced above, may be built.  Gearty presents a vision of the judiciary 
which sees judges more willing to engage in scrutinising public decisions under 
the HRA where any one of three principles are in play: ‘These are the principle 
	
	
27 Pfeifer v Austria (2009) 48 EHRR 8 [35].  
28 R (Wright) v Secretary of State for Health [2009] UKHL 3, [2009] 1 AC 739. 
29 X (n 15); Pay v Lancashire Probation Service [2004] ICR 187 (EAT); for criticism, see 
Mantouvalou (n 17). 
30 (2009) 48 EHRR SE2. 
31 Vogt v Germany (1996) 21 EHRR 205; Aslef v UK (2007) 45 EHRR 34; Redfearn v UK 
(2013) 57 EHRR 2. 
32 Kara v United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR CD272, 274. 
33 Young, James & Webster v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 38. 
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of respect for civil liberties; the principle of legality; and the principle of respect 
for human dignity’.34  
This is not only because these are important principles in their own right, 
but also because they are principles which the judiciary feel empowered to 
adjudicate upon. To explain this, Gearty uses the metaphor of a swimming pool 
with the shallow end marked ‘legal principle’ and the deep end marked ‘public 
policy’.35 In the shallow end, dealing with legal principle, is where the judges are 
most at home. Conversely, in the deep end, adjudicating on public policy, the 
judges are out of their depth. When any one of these three principles are 
engaged, however, judges consider themselves to be in the shallow end. 
This sub-section seeks to demonstrate that these three principles are 
sufficiently engaged in the dismissal scenarios in the previous sub-section and 
should therefore induce a similar response from judges in dismissal as they do in 
review of public action. Judges should consider themselves in the shallow end of 
the pool when analysing dismissals which engage Convention rights.  
In fact, there is a case to be made that the lack of constitutional constraints 
on judges in labour law should lead to even greater intervention than in public 
law.36 Consequently, the three principles are able to do more work in dismissals 
than in the vertical arena as the countervailing interest of managerial prerogative 
is not as weighty as the constitutional concern of ensuring proportionate 
intrusion into government business.37 By presenting this challenge from analogy 
to judicial attitudes, the way is cleared for an analysis of what a HRA based 
approach to dismissal law has to add to the status quo.  
 
Legal i ty  
 
Gearty gives his definition of legality as “one that requires all official action in a 
democratic state to be positively authorized by law”.38 The principle of legality 
involves fair play and due process.39 Legality in this sense is already found in the 
regime of unfair dismissal.  
	
	
34 Gearty, Principles (n 11) 4. 
35 ibid 121. 
36 Davies, ‘Judicial self-Restraint’ (n 9). 
37 Gearty, Principles (n 11) ch 7. 
38 Gearty, Principles (n 11) 60. 
39 ibid 128. 
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An employer’s failure to follow a fair procedure is by far the most 
likely ground for a successful unfair dismissal claim … The 
willingness to impose procedural standards has several 
explanations … it may of course simply be that in addressing 
questions of procedural fairness the courts are dealing with 
familiar judicial principles of ‘natural justice’ or ‘procedural due 
process’.40   
The emphasis on due process is best shown by Polkey v AE Dayton Services 
Ltd – procedures must be complied with regardless of whether the eventual 
outcome will be identical.41 The remedial inadequacy of Polkey from a human 
rights perspective is noted below under ‘Remedies’. The fact that judges already 
robustly protect the principle of legality in dismissal cases, requiring that 
dismissals comply with positively authorised and fair procedures, adds credence 
to the challenge from analogy. What it shows is a judicial confidence to uphold 
the principle of legality wherever it is engaged. It is also reminiscent of the 
‘prescribed by law’ requirement to be found in justifications for infringing 
Convention rights. The judicial propensity to protect due process in dismissal 
cases demonstrates that the judges feel comfortably in the shallow end of the 
pool. 
 
Digni ty  
 
Dignity is a notoriously slippery concept. Gearty describes it as ‘a core sentiment 
that lies behind and explains much of the language actually deployed in the 
Convention” and as “the notion that each person matters in view of his or her 
humanity’.42 Dignity, as a quality innate to all humans, is a term also discussed in 
labour law scholarship.43 Regardless of the term’s precise definition, it is clearly 
considered relevant in both legal areas. 
	
	
40 Hugh Collins, Nine Proposals for the Reform of the Law on Unfair Dismissal (Institute of 
Employment Rights 2004), 42. 
41 [1987] UKHL 8, [1988] ICR 142. 
42 Gearty, Principles (n 11) 84. 
43 Collins, Justice in Dismissal (n 5); B Hepple, ‘Human Rights and Employment Law’ 
(1998) 8 Amicus Curiae 19; Simon Deakin, 'The Utility of “Rights Talk”: Employees’ 
Personal Rights' in Conor Gearty and Adam Tomkins (eds), Understanding Human Rights 
(Pinter 1999) 357; Freedland and Kountouris (n 7); cf Christopher McCrudden, 'Labour 
Law as Human Rights Law: A Critique of the Use of “Dignity” by Freedland and 
Kountouris' in Alan Bogg, Cathryn Costello, and ACL Davies (eds), The Autonomy Of 
Labour Law (Hart Publishing 2015). 
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In unfair dismissal, dignity is most engaged in cases concerning the right to 
privacy. Many of these cases involve elements of control or domination, with 
the employer seeking to control an employee’s conduct outside of work, which 
fails to treat employees as autonomous individuals deserving of being treated 
with dignity.44 On a more basic level, the idea that ‘labour is not a commodity’ 
underlies much of the rationale behind controls on dismissal.45 In that sense, 
and according to Collins, all regulation of dismissal is justified by dignity and 
autonomy.46 Interestingly, it may be argued that the current regime already 
acknowledges the role that dignity plays in cases of unfair dismissals. An 
entitlement of an employee to a written statement of reasons for their dismissal, 
thereby acknowledging the employee’s agency, acts as evidence for this.47 
Consequently, especially in cases engaging Convention rights, there is a strong 
case to be made that the stakes for dignity may be as high in dismissal as they 
are in public law. Similar levels of review, therefore, should be conducted in 
both circumstances. 
 
Civ i l  Liber t i e s   
 
Basing his definition on the work of Feldman, Gearty states that ‘The subject of 
civil liberties is best viewed as being concerned with those freedoms which are 
essential to the maintenance and fostering of our representative system of 
government’.48 
In unfair dismissal, civil liberties are most engaged in dismissals touching 
upon Articles 10 and 11 ECHR, where an employee is dismissed pursuant to 
their political affiliation, speech, or membership of a trade union.49 Dismissals in 
these circumstances have a clear chilling effect on civil liberties and detract from 
the quality of the UK’s democracy. The fear of losing one’s livelihood is a 
strong disincentive to engaging in political speech and association. It is clear to 
see how such dismissals engage the principle of respect for civil liberties. As 
with dignity, therefore, similar levels of review should be conducted in dismissal 
	
	
44 Mantouvalou, 'Human Rights and unfair dismissal’ (n 17). 
45 Declaration concerning the Aims and Purposes of the International Labour 
Organisation, adopted at the 26th session of the ILO, Philadelphia, 10 May 1944. 
46 Collins, Justice in Dismissal (n 5). 
47 ERA 1996, s 92. 
48 Gearty, Principles (n 11) 34; David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England 
and wales (2nd edn, OUP 2001). 
49 Vogt (n 31); Aslef (n 31); Redfearn v UK (n 31); Young (n 33). 
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cases impacting upon political activity covered by the HRA as in equivalent 
public law cases.  
The challenge from analogy has sought to show that the principles that 
lead judges to intervene more robustly in public law cases under the HRA, 
rather than exercise restraint or deference, are also engaged where a dismissal 
involves Convention rights. In doing so, given the lack of constitutional 
constraints on judges in dismissals, the claim is made that judges should 
abandon their deference to managerial prerogative in Convention rights 
sensitive dismissals50 and instead adopt a HRA based approach – the value of 
which is assessed in Part II. 
 
II. APPLYING THE HRA TO UNFAIR DISMISSALS 
 
Personal Scope 
 
Universality is a key tenet of human rights law, reflected at Article 1 ECHR and 
in the HRA by virtue of the s 3 interpretative obligation and duty under  s 6. 
Therefore, the first problematic aspect of the unfair dismissal regime form a 
human rights perspective is its lack of universality. There are two principal ways 
in which access to a claim for unfair dismissal is restricted: first, the inability of 
‘workers’ to claim unfair dismissal;51 and, second, the qualifying period requiring 
two years’ continuous service before an employee is eligible to claim.52  
 
Workers 
 
Access to the right to claim unfair dismissal is limited to ‘employees’ – meaning 
those engaged under a contract of employment.53 Collins has described this state 
of affairs as “as unjustifiable as it is inexplicable” and the extension of 
protection from unfair dismissal to workers is one of his nine proposed reforms 
to the law on unfair dismissal.54 Davies characterises this as a ‘radical’ position.55 
	
	
50 Davies, Judicial Self-Restraint (n 9). 
51 ERA 1996, s 94. 
52 ERA 1996, s 108 
53 ERA 1996, s 230(1). 
54 Collins, Nine Proposals (n 40) 9. 
55 ACL Davies, Perspectives on Labour Law (2nd edn, CUP 2009) 83. 
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However the present case is that workers should enjoy protection from unfair 
dismissal where their Convention rights are engaged. Thus, the position is 
consonant with Davies’ view that protection of fundamental rights should be 
extended to all workers.56 
The inadequacy of the distinction is exemplified by O’Kelly v Trusthouse Forte 
Plc.57 In this case, casual wine waiters were for all intents and purposes dismissed 
pursuant to their attempts to organise with the help of a union. Their claim for 
unfair dismissal, however, failed without any consideration of the employer’s 
motives due to their status as workers. O’Kelly is an extreme example but 
demonstrates how the distinction fails to adequately protect Convention rights 
in relevant cases. 
Applying a HRA based approach to unfair dismissal law would alleviate 
this issue significantly. Section 3 HRA might be used so as to read and give 
effect to the following reading of s 94 ERA as follows: ‘An employee, and a 
worker where their Convention rights are engaged, has the right not to be 
unfairly dismissed by his employer.’ Such a reading would not go against the 
overriding statutory regime.58 Moreover, the fact that workers enjoy the 
protection of many other employment rights, such as discrimination, allows the 
courts to infer Parliamentary intent on this matter thereby avoiding any 
Parliamentary sovereignty criticisms.  
 
The Qualifying Period 
	
The qualifying period, at s 108 ERA, denies access to a claim for unfair dismissal 
to employees who do not possess two years of continuous service. Generally, 
the existence of a qualifying period is within a state’s margin of appreciation.59 
However, in Redfearn, it was ruled that the satisfaction of a qualifying period in 
cases where a dismissal may be in breach of Convention rights constitutes a 
disproportionate exclusion.60 Therefore, for the dismissals with which this paper 
is concerned, the dilemma of the qualifying period has already been largely 
solved.  
The dilemma does, however, remain for dismissed individuals who are 
unable to hang their claim on a ‘human rights hook’. This, inter alia, has 
	
	
56 Ibid. 
57 [1984] QB 90 (CA). 
58 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557. 
59 Stedman v United Kingdom (1997) 23 EHRR CD 168. 
60 Redfearn (n 31). 
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precipitated calls for an ‘integrated approach’ to labour rights in interpreting the 
ECHR.61 Failing this, there may also be a case to be made that an ‘integrated 
approach’ to labour rights is possible under the HRA. Indeed, the case may be 
stronger as the margin of appreciation, which currently protects the general 
qualifying period, is afforded to states, not to governments, and therefore as a 
branch of the state the judiciary is not limited by it. It is now acknowledged that 
the HRA creates domestic rights and the judiciary are currently riding on a wave 
of support for common law constitutional rights.62 Therefore, although unlikely, 
there is nothing in principle precluding the judiciary from integrating the right to 
unfair dismissal, so labelled at s 94 ERA, in the HRA. In that sense, the HRA 
may be partially informed by the ERA in a similar way to how the ESC helps 
give content to the rights in the ECHR.  
In any event, for present purposes, what is of note is that the qualifying 
period is no longer an issue for dismissals engaging an individual’s Convention 
rights. Indeed, ensuring robust scrutiny of dismissals in such circumstances is a 
prudent step to be taken before seeking to extend that scrutiny in all cases.   
Therefore, it may be seen that a HRA based approach to relevant 
dismissals either has the capacity to grant greater protection to Convention 
rights, or has already managed to do so, following Strasbourg case law, without 
need for legislative modification of the statutory qualifying period.  
 
Reasons For Dismissal 
	
There are three categories of reasons for dismissal: automatically fair,63 
automatically unfair,64 and potentially fair.65 The latter two are most relevant to 
the present enquiry.  
 
Automatically Unfair Reasons 
	
	
	
61 V. Mantouvalou, 'Labour Rights in the European Convention on Human Rights: An 
Intellectual Justification for an Integrated Approach to Interpretation' (2013) 13(3) 
Human Rights Law Review 529. 
62 E.g. Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20, [2015] AC 455. 
63 ERA 1996, s 10(4); Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, s 
237. 
64 ERA 1996, ss 99 - 105. 
65 ERA 1996, ss 98(1)(b) and 98(2). 
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In the interests of space, the list of automatically unfair reasons will not be given 
here. Collins lists three types of reason for dismissal that are treated as 
automatically unfair: protection of social rights, protection of worker 
representatives in performing their functions, and victimisation for asserting a 
statutory right enforceable in an employment tribunal.66 Dismissals for these 
reasons will result in an automatic finding of unfair dismissal and entitle the 
individual to a remedy. 
As a product of legislation, the contents of the list of automatically unfair 
reasons are a political choice. There are some omissions which commentators 
have been critical of such as dismissals relating to political expression or 
religion.67 Collins has called for the rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union to be included in the list.68 
A HRA based approach to dismissals will not give rise to these 
developments. That is not, however, a shortcoming of the approach. Automatic 
unfair dismissals allow no room for justification – therefore, it is difficult to see 
why qualified rights should enjoy absolute protection upon engagement. A more 
balanced approach, which the HRA allows for, would necessitate a discussion as 
to the proportionality of the dismissal, including whether the dismissal pursued 
a legitimate aim. It is the failure at present of the courts to apply a true 
proportionality analysis in these cases, which has in part induced calls for a 
wider category of automatically unfair reasons. A true proportionality analysis 
would swiftly consider unmeritorious reasons unfair.  
Therefore, although a HRA based approach to dismissals engaging 
Convention rights would be unable to widen the list of automatically unfair 
reasons for dismissal, this is no great disadvantage.  
 
Potentially Fair Reasons  
	
Two elements make up a potentially fair dismissal: firstly, the actual reason 
relied upon;69 secondly, the reasonableness of the employer’s action in 
dismissing the employee for that reason.70 
	
	
66 Collins, Nine Proposals (n 40) 75. 
67 Deakin, The Utility of Rights Talk (n 43) 366. 
68 Collins, Nine Proposals (n 40) 78. 
69 ERA 1996, ss 98(1)(b) and 98 (2). 
70 ERA 1996, s 98(4). 
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The first step is to identify which of the four potentially fair reasons the 
employer had for the dismissal. They are conduct, capability, redundancy, and 
‘some other substantial reason’.71 These reasons are largely in line with 
international standards and reflect Article 4 ILO Convention 158, Termination 
of Employment, 1982 – a treaty not ratified by the UK. Despite this fact, the 
reasons are not without controversy, and Deakin has labelled their width as one 
of the problems with unfair dismissal from a rights-based perspective.72 For 
example, the category of ‘some other substantial reason’ has been found to 
include dismissals as a result of an employee’s difficult personality, and 
dismissals arising from pressures to dismiss.73  
These flaws are, however, endemic of the unfair dismissal regime generally. 
It is the reasonableness element that is more relevant to the enquiry of what a 
HRA based approach to unfair dismissal can add to dismissals engaging an 
individual’s Convention rights. It is the reasonableness element also which has 
most robustly repelled a genuine HRA interpretation to such dismissals. 
Moreover, remedying the deficiency of the reasonableness element, by applying 
a proportionality analysis in cases engaging Convention rights, would alleviate 
the worst symptoms of the breadth of the potentially fair reasons in the statute.  
 
Reasonableness 
	
‘The Band of Reasonable Responses’ 
	
In order to assess whether an employer acted ‘reasonably’ in the circumstances 
by dismissing the employee, the courts have adopted the notorious ‘band of 
reasonable responses’ test (BORR) set out in Iceland Frozen Foods v Jones:74 
[T]he function of the industrial tribunal, as an industrial jury, is to 
determine whether in the particular circumstance of each case the 
decision to dismiss the employee fell within the band of 
reasonable responses which a reasonable employer might have 
adopted. If the dismissal falls within the band the dismissal is fair: 
if the dismissal falls outside the band it is unfair.75 
	
	
71 ERA 1996, ss 98(1)(b) and 98(2). 
72 Deakin, The Utility of Rights Talk (n 43) 364. 
73 Perkin v St. George’s Healthcare NHS Trust [2005] EWCA 1174, [2006] ICR 617; Dobie v 
Burns International Security Services (UK) Ltd [1983] IRLR 278 (CA). 
74 Iceland (n 2). 
75 ibid. 
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This test, after some judicial criticism,76 has been reaffirmed and remains 
law.77 The test instructs tribunals to assess the reasonableness of the decision to 
dismiss from the perspective of the hypothetical reasonable employer – it must 
not substitute its own view as to the reasonableness of the decision. The breadth 
of the BORR, and the weight given to managerial prerogative under the test, is 
exhibited by Ackner LJ in British Leyland UK Ltd v Swift: 
As has been frequently said in these cases, there may well be 
circumstances in which reasonable employers might react 
differently. An employer might reasonably take the view, if the 
circumstances so justified, that his attitude must be a firm and 
definite one and must involve dismissal in order to deter other 
employees from like conduct. Another employer might quite 
reasonably on compassionate grounds treat the case as a special 
case.78 
Under this test it is clear that, as Collins puts it, ‘considerations of respect 
for the civil liberties [and human rights] of employees rarely surface in the 
reasoning of the courts and tribunals’.79 Consequently, the test has been heavily 
criticised in a vast academic literature – it has been likened to a perversity test 
and the Wednesbury test in administrative law,80 described as an ‘unwarranted 
gloss on the statute’,81 and as switching the emphasis from requiring an 
employer to act reasonably to requiring that an employer does not act 
unreasonably.82  
	
	
76 Haddon v Van den Bergh Foods [1999] ICR 1150 (EAT). 
77 Post Office v Foley; Midland Bank plc v Madden [2000] IRLR 827 (CA); Sainsbury’s 
Supermarkets Ltd v Hitt [2002] EWCA Civ 1588, [2003] ICR 111; London Ambulance Service 
NHS Trust v Small [2009] EWCA Civ 220, [2009] IRLR 563; Orr v Milton Keynes Council 
[2011] EWCA Civ 62, [2011] 4 All ER 1256; Turner (n 2). 
78 British Leyland UK Ltd v Swift [1981] IRLR 91 (CA). 
79 Collins, Justice in Dismissal (n 5) 185-86. 
80 Associated Provincial Picture House v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1, [1948] 1 KB 
223; Davies, Judicial Self-Restraint (n 9) 293; PL Davies and MR Freedland, ‘The Impact of 
Public Law on Labour Law, 1972-1997’ (1997) 26 ILJ 311; Collins, Nine Proposals (n 40) 35; 
Heather Williams QC ‘Dismissal and the Band of Reasonable Responses; an Unconventional 
Approach to Convention Rights?’ (Oxford Human Rights Hub, 4 December 2012) 
<http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/dismissal-and-the-band-of-reasonable-responses-an-
unconventional-approach-to-convention-rights/> accessed 27 April 2016. 
81 Collins, Nine Proposals (n 40) 36. 
82 Collins, Justice in Dismissal (n 5) 39; cf D Cabrelli, ‘The Hierarchy of Differing 
Behavioural Standards of Review in Labour Law’ (2011) 40 Industrial Law Journal 146. 
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The UK courts have stated that the BORR is not a perversity or Wednesbury 
test – most recently by Elias LJ in Turner.83 This is unconvincing – given the 
breadth of the test, it is difficult to envisage an instance in which an employer’s 
decision falls outside the BORR and cannot be characterised as perverse.  
Given that Wednesbury and its variants have been explicitly rejected by 
Strasbourg, it is of concern that the BORR remains the standard of review in 
dismissal cases engaging Convention rights.84 What a HRA based approach, 
built out of the challenge from analogy, has the capacity to contribute to this 
area of dismissal is the imposition of proportionality to the reasonableness 
element of potentially fair dismissals.85  
There has been, however, a spate of domestic decisions paying lip service 
to protecting Convention rights and intensifying the standard of review whilst 
failing to apply a genuine proportionality analysis.86 This line of authority has 
culminated in the ruling in Turner that the BORR is compatible as a justificatory 
test under the Convention – a decision that requires refuting in order to make 
the claim that a HRA based approach can inject proportionality into the 
reasonableness test. 
 
Turner v East Midlands Trains Ltd 
	
In Turner, the claimant employee was dismissed from her job as a senior train 
conductor due to allegations of misconduct. The employer alleged that the 
employee had deliberately manipulated the ticket machine so as to sell 
fraudulent tickets and retain the proceeds. There was no direct evidence and the 
employee denied the allegations. The employer based their case on statistics and 
inferences which could be drawn from the data – an approach that the employee 
accepted as adequate by the standards of domestic unfair dismissal law. 
However, most importantly for present purposes, the employee alleged that the 
dismissal engaged her Article 8 rights due to the damage to her reputation 
flowing from the dismissal. In these circumstances, the employee alleged that 
the domestic BORR did not meet the requirements of Article 8, necessitating 
the application of  a proportionality analysis. 
	
	
83 Turner (n 2) [18]. 
84 Smith (n 26). 
85 L Vickers, ‘Unfair Dismissal and Human Rights’ (2004) 33 Industrial Law Journal 52. 
86 McGowan v Scottish Water [2005] IRLR 167 (EAT); X (n 15); Pay (n 29); Copsey v WWB 
Devon Clays Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 932, [2005] IRLR 81.  
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Rejecting the claimant employee’s submissions, Elias LJ held that the 
BORR applies to all aspects of the dismissal process, including whether 
adequate procedures were adopted,87 and that the test provided a sufficiently 
robust analysis of the decision to ensure compliance with Article 8. Moreover, 
Elias LJ stated that the domestic test may protect human rights more effectively 
than the Strasbourg proportionality test.88 
Turner is an unfortunate judgment. Elias LJ’s analysis is incoherent in 
respect of both its finding of equivalence between the BORR and 
proportionality, and its characterisation of Strasbourg authority. 
 
Proportionality and the ‘band of reasonable responses’ test – structural 
differences 
 
Conventional wisdom under the HRA and in Strasbourg case law necessitates 
that infringements on Convention rights are assessed by proportionality – 
Wednesbury and its variants are incompatible.89 This is relevant, as Elias LJ’s 
defence of the variable nature of the BORR, when Convention rights are 
engaged, appears very similar to the rejected super-Wednesbury test.90 
Lord Reed in Bank Mellat provides the most recent and authoritative 
formulation of the proportionality test under the HRA.91 Paraphrasing, there are 
four limbs:  
1. the limitation on the right must pursue a legitimate aim; 
2. the measure taken must be rationally connected to that legitimate aim; 
3. there must be no less restrictive measure available; and  
4. on balance, is the impact of the rights infringement disproportionate to 
the likely benefit of the impugned measure.  
 
The BORR falls well below this standard. By virtue of the very fact that it 
allows for a ‘band’ or ‘range’ of responses, it is clear that it permits for dismissals 
which may not necessarily be the least restrictive measure to achieve the 
employer’s legitimate aim. Moreover, proportionality by its nature requires the 
	
	
87 Whitbread plc v Hall [2001] IRLR 275 (CA); Sainsbury's Supermarkets v Hitt [2003] IRLR 
23 (CA).  
88 Turner (n 2) [56]. 
89 Smith (n 26). 
90 Turner (n 2) [52]; A v B [2003] IRLR 405 (EAT); Salford Royal NHS Foundation Trust v 
Roldan [2010] EWCA Civ 522, [2010] ICR 1457. 
91 Bank Mellat v HM Treasury [2013] UKSC 39, [2014] A.C. 700 [74].  
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court/tribunal to make its own independent assessment as to whether there has 
been a violation of a Convention right.92 Contrastingly, the BORR, as seen 
above, actively deters tribunals from forming their own view of the 
reasonableness of the employer’s decision to dismiss. The assertion by Elias LJ 
that the BORR may more effectively protect Convention rights is highly flawed. 
This is especially the case in the context of domestic dismissal cases where 
courts and tribunals need not consider the ‘Margin of Appreciation’ or the 
aspiration of institutional preservation that drives some of the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence.  
 
Incoherent and partial view of authority 
 
In seeking to establish the BORR as Article 8 compliant, Elias LJ offered an 
incoherent and partial view of Strasbourg authority.  
Due to the employee’s case centring on the incompatibility of the 
procedure adopted, Elias LJ was required first to jump the preliminary hurdle of 
demonstrating that Article 8 does not require a proportionality analysis in 
respect of procedural fairness. In jumping this hurdle, Elias LJ cited a number 
of Strasbourg authorities.93 However, it is difficult to conclude from the 
passages cited that the authorities disavow a proportionality analysis. In 
McMichael, the required standard of procedure was ‘to a degree sufficient to 
provide… the requisite protection of… interests’.94 This begs the question of 
what is ‘sufficient’ and ‘requisite’ – usually answered through an assessment of 
proportionality. Similarly, in Buckley, it is stated that interfering measures must 
be ‘fair’ and afford ‘due respect’ to Article 8 interests.95 What is ‘fair’ and affords 
‘due respect’ is typically determined by proportionality. Finally, in Turek, the 
standard of procedural protection is said to be one which offers ‘practical’ and 
‘effective’ protection of Article 8 rights – two metrics usually distilled, again, 
through proportionality. In this context, it is difficult to see how the weight of 
findings of fair dismissal, pursuant to the BORR, may be claimed to amount to 
‘effective’ protection. Indeed, conventional Strasbourg wisdom dictates that 
insufficient procedural safeguards may result in a violation of Article 8.96 
Therefore, the conclusion Elias LJ draws from these cases, which fall short of 
	
	
92 Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, [2011] 2 AC 104. 
93 McMichael v UK (1995) 20 EHRR 205 [102]; Buckley v UK (1997) 23 EHRR 101 [76]; 
Turek v Slovakia (2007) 44 EHRR 43 [113]. 
94 McMichael (n 93). 
95 Buckley (n 93). 
96 Connors (n 25). 
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an explicit rejection of proportionality, represent a partial and incoherent view 
of authority.   
A further, more egregious example of Elias LJ’s partial presentation of the 
Strasbourg case law is found in his reliance on Palomo Sanchez.97 Elias LJ cites 
Palomo Sanchez as authority for the position that, due to the leeway afforded to 
employers in dismissal cases, the BORR is Article 8 compliant.98 Implicit in that 
position is the finding that no proportionality analysis is required. However, at 
paragraph 30, it is stated that ‘the proportionality of a measure of dismissal in 
relation to the conduct of the employee concerned underlies all the legislation 
analysed.’ Indeed, an explicit proportionality analysis, within which account is 
taken of the employer’s discretion, is conducted at paragraphs 69 – 77 of Palomo 
Sanchez.  
A final note on the incoherence and partiality of Elias LJ’s analysis of the 
authorities concerns those relevant cases which were omitted. The judgment 
makes no references to the cases of Pay v UK, Vogt v Germany or Obst v Germany – 
all of which address infringements with Article 8 rights in employment contexts 
through the lens of proportionality.99 Particularly in Pay, the Strasbourg court 
‘did not ask whether the employer acted “reasonably’ or “within a range of 
reasonable responses”’, and therefore it would appear that ‘the test of 
justification under Article 8(2) differs from the normal test of reasonableness for 
unfair dismissal’.100 Moreover, the Strasbourg court continues to assess such 
infringements on a proportionality basis.101 Such cases, therefore, point strongly 
in the direction that Article 8 requires that any infringements be assessed as a 
matter of proportionality, contrary to the decision in Turner.  
 
Turner – conclusions 
 
In light of the above, there is a strong case to be made that the judgment in 
Turner v East Midlands Trains requires revisiting, and that the BORR does not 
satisfy the requirements of Article 8. Ultimately, Turner is a judgment 
symptomatic of the judicial view challenged in Part I. Therefore, suspending 
	
	
97 Palomo Sanchez v Spain (2012) 54 EHRR 24. 
98 Turner (n 2) [53]. 
99 Pay v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR SE2; Vogt (n 31); Obst v Germany App no 425/03 
(ECtHR, September 23, 2010); Schuth v Germany (2011) 52 EHRR 32. 
100 V. Mantouvalou and H. Collins, 'Private life and dismissal: Pay v UK' (2009) 38(1) 
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disbelief and assuming that the judiciary take a more reflective institutional view 
of self as suggested, there is a strong case that a HRA based approach to 
relevant dismissals would yield a different result.  
Indeed, a HRA based approach coupled with a shift in judicial attitudes, is 
capable of offering a proportionality analysis in dismissals engaging Convention 
rights. This would bring unfair dismissal in line with HRA analyses in other 
areas and with the direction of travel in Strasbourg.102 
 
Remedies 
	
There are three possible remedies for unfair dismissal: reinstatement, 
reengagement, and compensation.103 The compensatory award has two 
elements: a basic award and a compensatory award. The basic award is 
calculated by statutory formula. The compensatory award is calculated by what 
the tribunal considers just and equitable.104 
The practice of this remedial scheme has a number of deficiencies: firstly, a 
negligible number of unfair dismissals result in orders of reinstatement or 
reengagement. Only 5 of 5,100 upheld cases in 2011-2012 made such orders.105 
Secondly, the damages awarded in unfair dismissal cases are low – the median 
award in 2011-2012 being £4,560.106 Thirdly, there is a statutory cap on the 
amount of damages available for an unfair dismissal which is currently set at 
£72,300.107 Fourthly, in a finding of unfair dismissal for a failure to follow 
correct procedures, an award of damages may be reduced by up to 50% if the 
employer shows that the employee would have been dismissed in any event - the 
Polkey deduction108. Fifthly, awards may be reduced for contributory negligence 
or subsequent proof of good cause for summary dismissal to zero.109 Sixthly, 
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M Freedland and others (eds), The Contract of Employment (OUP 2016), 205. 
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<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/218
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and problematically from a rights perspective, no damages may be awarded for 
non-pecuniary loss.110 
At present, it would appear that a HRA based approach to dismissals 
engaging Convention rights would be of limited use in bolstering the remedial 
regime.111 The reason for this is that damages under the HRA have thus far 
been subject to Lord Bingham’s ‘mirror’ principle.112 The ‘mirror’ principle 
holds that courts and tribunals must look exclusively to Strasbourg 
jurisprudence for guidance on the award of damages and as to quantum. This is 
problematic for unfair dismissal as Strasbourg, under Article 41, recognises only 
‘just satisfaction’.113 The effect has been to preclude, inter alia, awards of punitive 
damages under the HRA – a key recommendation of Collins, alongside 
injunctions, for the reform of unfair dismissal.114 Moreover, remedies for 
breaches of human rights may also be purely declaratory. Space precludes a full 
discussion of the flaws of this approach, but there have been calls for a tort-
based approach to HRA damages.115 
It is worth noting that there since the development of the principle of 
judicial ‘dialogue’ there may be some light on the horizon for damages under the 
HRA.116 However, at present, a HRA based approach to dismissals engaging 
Convention rights would be of limited efficacy in respect of improving the 
remedial regime for unfair dismissal.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this paper has been to make the case for a HRA based approach 
to dismissals engaging Convention rights.  
In making the case, two interconnected exercises have been conducted. 
Firstly, it was necessary to pave the way for a HRA based approach to 
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dismissals. This was done through demonstrating horizontality and, more 
importantly, introducing the ‘challenge from analogy’ to the judicial institutional 
view of self in dismissal cases. Secondly, the potential of such an approach was 
assessed. It is clear from the preceding analysis that a HRA based approach has 
the potential to vastly improve the protection of Convention rights in dismissal 
by widening the personal scope of the action, and by injecting a proportionality 
analysis into the assessment of the reasonableness of decisions to dismiss. 
There are, however, limitations to a HRA based approach: firstly, in order 
to benefit from the increased protection, an individual must be able to hang 
their claim on a ‘human rights hook’; secondly, it is unlikely to positively affect 
remedies for unfair dismissal; and, thirdly, to be applied at its height it requires 
that the ‘challenge from analogy’ to judicial attitudes be accepted. On this last 
point, however, the contemporary judicial willingness to engage with matters 
previously thought beyond their competence, such as the bedroom tax litigation, 
may indicate a climate of judicial intervention in which the ‘challenge from 
analogy’ may be more readily accepted.117 
Space has precluded a full analysis of the literature on the underlying 
theory of dismissal law.118 Considering what Collins would add to a second 
edition of Justice in Dismissal would be a fruitful area of further research. Since his 
monograph, the HRA has been passed and the UK courts have developed a 
healthy rights jurisprudence. Better distilling the underlying theoretical 
importance of protection from dismissal, in this context, could offer an 
intellectual architecture from which the courts, accepting the ‘challenge from 
analogy’, could build a stronger unfair dismissal regime for all workers.  
A necessary first step, however, is ensuring that sufficient protection is 
offered in instances of dismissal engaging rights which the law already recognises 
as important – Convention rights. This paper hopes to contribute towards 
taking that first step.  
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